Abstract. This paper analyses Escardó and Oliva's generalisation of selection functions over a strong monad from a game-theoretic perspective. We focus on the case of the nondeterminism (finite nonempty powerset) monad P f . We use these nondeterministic selection functions of type J P f R X = (X → R) → P f (X) to study sequential games, extending previous work linking (deterministic) selection functions to game theory. Similar to deterministic selection functions, which compute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play of a game, we characterise those nondeterministic selection functions which have a clear game-theoretic interpretation. Surprisingly, we show no non-deterministic selection function exists which computes the set of all subgame perfect Nash equilibrium plays. Instead we show that there are selection functions corresponding to sequential versions of the iterated removal of strongly and weakly dominated strategies.
Introduction
Selection functions are an approach to games of perfect information developed by Escardó and Oliva in a series of papers beginning with [EO10] . As well as revealing a deep connection between game theory and proof theory, this approach elucidates the mathematical structure of backward induction, a method to compute equilibria, showing that it arises from a more primitive algebraic structure known as the selection monad. A more general form of the selection monad was developed in [EO17] for proof-theoretic purposes, with a special case appearing in [Hed14] . In this paper we explore this more general structure from a game-theoretic perspective.
A selection function is a function (specifically a type-2 function, also known as a functional or operator, i.e. a function whose domain is a set of functions) of type (X → R) → X, which we write J R X. The operator J R , which associates to every set X the set of functions (X → R) → X, is called the selection monad, and it carries an algebraic structure known as a strong monad. One consequence of this structure is that there is a family of product-like operators
called the product of selection functions.
An important class of selection functions are those of the form ε : J R n X satisfying ε(k) ∈ arg max(π i • k) for all k : X → R n , where arg max(f ) = {x : X | f (x) ≥ f (x ′ ) for all x ′ : X} Consider an n-player game of perfect information. That is to say, all players move in turn and the current state of the game is known all players. In round i, player i selects a move from the set X i , with payoffs for all players given by q :
The usual solution concept for games of this form is known as subgame perfect equilibrium -a strengthening of Nash equilibrium. These equilibria can be computed using a method known as backward induction which dates back at least to Zermelo [SW01] .
The key result connecting selection functions with game theory is that if ε i is a sequence of selection functions (1 ≤ i ≤ n) satisfying ε i (k) ∈ arg max(π i • k) for all k :
is the strategic play of some subgame perfect equilibrium (i.e. the play that results when the players' strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium). The operator expresses the essence of the backward induction method in a mathematically pure way. Surprisingly, this result extends to n = ∞ when q is continuous, a highly non-obvious fact about backward induction that is often directly contradicted in game theory textbooks, e.g. [FT91, pp. 107] . Notice that the operator arg max itself has the type (X → R) → P f (X), which we write J P f R X, when X is finite and nonempty. Also note that in this paper P f refers to the finite nonempty powerset monad. In [EO17] it is proved that J P f R is a strong monad when R is a meet-semilattice (and more generally that J T R is a strong monad when T is a strong monad and R is a T -algebra), however this has so far not been addressed through the lens of game theory. It follows that each choice of meet-semilattice structure on R induces a product
and hence, if q is the payoff function of a game, we obtain a set of plays ( n i=1 arg max) (q). One may conjecture that there is some choice of meetsemilattice structure for which this set is the set of plays of all subgame perfect equilibria.
We prove that this is not the case. We complement this negative characterization by a positive one: If one replaces the Nash subgame condition by a weaker condition, which we call rational, then the product of multivalued selection functions does exactly characterize the set of all plays in line with this condition. Examples of this weaker condition are weak and strong dominance of strategies -standard solution concepts in game theory.
Outline. In section 2.1 we give background on selection functions, and in section 2.2 on higher-order sequential games. In section 3 we define a condition on selection functions, and characterise for 2-round games the product of those selection functions that satisfy this condition. In section 4 we show that the product of selection functions does not compute subgame perfect equilibria in general, and also characterise those cases when it does. In section 5 we give a more general theorem characterising the product of selection functions for nround games, and give concrete examples with selection functions that pick out strongly and weakly dominated strategies.
Preliminaries
We begin with introducing selection functions and sequential games of perfect information.
Selection functions
Formally, in this paper we work over some fixed cartesian closed category which contains analogues of finite sets and R. Since we are working only with finite games, there is no harm in taking this to be simply the category of sets. We will treat monads 'Haskell-style', defined by their action on objects, their unit and their bind operator (which is Kleisli extension with the arguments swapped). Definition 1. Let T be a strong monad and α : T R → R. The T -selection monad is defined by J T R X = (X → R) → T X with the following monad operations:
As a special case, when T is the identity monad we use the notation J R X = (X → R) → X, which has bind operator
where g : X → Y is defined by g(x) = f (x)(k). Since the identity function uniquely makes every type into an algebra of the identity monad, J R is a strong monad for every R.
Every strong monad T admits a monoidal product operator
(in fact it admits two in general, and we take the 'left-leaning' one), and a more general dependent monoidal product operator
For example, for the finite nonempty powerset monad P f the monoidal product is given by cartesian product of sets
and the dependent monoidal product is the 'dependent cartesian product'
For the purposes of this paper we will only need the simple monoidal product of the selection monad, but it is defined in terms of the dependent monoidal product of the underlying monad. Concretely, the simple monoidal product
When T is the identity monad this simplifies to
where a = ε(λx.q(x, f x)) and f (x) = δ(λy.q(x, y)). Alternatively, when
where a = ε (λx. {q(x, y) | y ∈ f (x)}) and f (x) = δ(λy.q(x, y)), where the P falgebra is written : P f R → R.
Higher-order sequential games
A sequential game of perfect information is one in which players take turns sequentially, one player per round, with each player being able to perfectly observe the moves made in earlier rounds. Higher-order sequential games are a generalisation introduced in [EO10] in which each player carries a selection function that defines what they consider 'rational'. Ordinary (or 'classical') sequential games are obtained as the special case in which every player's selection function is arg max. An in-depth discussion of the decision-theoretic and game-theoretic content of higher-order games can be found in [HOS + 17a,HOS
Definition 2. An n-round higher order sequential game of perfect information is defined by the following data:
-For each player 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a finite nonempty set X i of choices -A set R of outcomes, and an outcome function q :
There are several small variants of this definition in the literature, which replace multi-valued selection functions with related higher order functions. The original definition in [EO10] equipped players with a 'quantifier' of type (X → R) → R rather than a selection function, with the motivating example being max : (X → R) → R. This was then generalised to multi-valued quantifiers of type (X → R) → P(R) in [EO11] . The definition stated above was given in [Hed16, section 1.3], and is based on the definition of Nash equilibrium for higher-order simultaneous games in [HOS + 17b] . Here, we apply this definition in the context of sequential games.
We will often focus on 2-player sequential games, in which we write the sets of choices as X and Y , and the selection functions as ε :
Definition 3. An n-round classical sequential game of perfect information is a sequential game in which the set of outcomes is R = R n , and the selection functions are
A classical game is one in which each player receives a real-valued outcome, and players act such as to maximise their individual outcome, with no preference over the outcomes of the other players. By different choices of q, this allows representation of both conflict and cooperative situations, and games with aspects of both, as is standard in game theory.
Definition 4. A strategy for player i in a sequential game is a function σ i :
i−1 j=1 X j → X i that makes a choice for player i contingent on the choices observed in previous rounds. A strategy profile is a tuple σ :
consisting of a strategy for each player. The set of strategy profiles of a game is written Σ.
Notice that a strategy for the first player is just an element of X 1 , up to isomorphism.
Definition 5. A play of a sequential game is a tuple x : n i=1 X i of choices. Every strategy profile σ induces a play P(σ), called the strategic play of σ, by 'playing out', or more precisely by the course-of-values recursion
This definition includes the base case (P(σ)) 1 = σ 1 (), i.e. the choice made by the first player is just the choice that her strategy tells her to play.
Definition 6. A partial play of a sequential game is a tuple x : j i=1 X i for some j < n. Given a partial play x, a tuple of strategies σ :
induces a play x σ called the strategic extension of x by σ, given by
A strategy profile of a 2-player sequential game is a tuple σ : X × (X → Y ), and the strategic play of σ is (σ 1 , σ 2 (σ 1 )). Also notice that the strategic extension of the empty partial play by σ is P(σ).
Selection functions in general describe what choices, plays or strategies are 'good' or 'rational' for a player. But there are several possibilities we can consider concretely. In the following, looking through the lens of game theory, we investigate these candidates.
Rationality and respecting joins
We begin by specifying a 'niceness' constraint for multivalued selection functions and show that these 'nice' selection functions admit a natural game theoretic interpretation. A first approximation of 'niceness' is join-union agreement -that ε(λx. i p i (x)) should be the same as i ε(p i ). We must allow for cases where the indexing set from which the i are drawn is dependent on the input x of the function λx. i p i (x) and we also find it convenient to state two lax conditions rather than one strict condition. With this in mind:
Definition 7. Let R be a semilattice. A multivalued selection function ε : J P f R X left-respects the semi-lattice R if for any indexing function I :
and we say that ε right-respects R if the converse holds for all I : X → P f (X → R):
This definition warrants some explanation. Given an indexing set I : X → P f (X → R), we think of I(x) as the set of possible contexts given the choice x. The condition '∃p ∈ I(x) such that x ∈ ε(p)' can therefore be interpreted as 'given choice x it is possible that a context p acceptable to ε will arise.' The condition
says that ε would be satisfied with the R-maximal possible outcome given choice x. We can view left-respecting R as a kind of reasonableness constraint on players -if ε is happy to play x in the context λx ′ . p∈I(x ′ ) p(x ′ ) then there is some possible context p ∈ I(x) that is a witness of ε's preference. Right-respecting R is a consistency constraint -if ε is satisfied with the outcome p(x) for p ∈ I(x), then ε is also satisfied with the outcome p ′ ∈I(x) p ′ (x) which, according to the algebra R, is at least as good as p(x). Example 1. Let X be a finite set. arg max : (X → R) → P f (X) does not leftor right-respect the semilattice on R where = max. Let X = B = {0, 1} and define an indexing function I : B → P f (B → R) by I(0) = {c 0 (x) = −1} and I(1) = {∼} where ∼ is Boolean negation. Then arg max λx.
p∈I (x) p(x) = {1} but 1 ∈ arg max(∼) = {0}. Hence arg max does not left-respect max. Also, 0 ∈ arg max(c −1 ) but 0 ∈ arg max λx. p∈I(x) p(x) . Hence arg max does not right-respect max.
For our purposes a choice will be seen as rational in a context if that choice delivers a satisfactory outcome under some reasonable hypothesis regarding how later players will behave in a sequential game. Players acting earlier will have less information and will therefore be acting under more uncertainty than later players. For 2-stage games this notion of rationality is captured precisely in the following definition. 1. σ 1 ∈ ε(λx.q(x, y)) for some y ∈ δ(λy.q(σ 1 , y)) 2. σ 2 (x) ∈ δ(λy.q(x, y)) for all x : X We write Rat(q, ε, δ) for the set of strategic plays of rational strategy profiles in the game defined by (q, ε, δ), i.e.
Rat(q, ε, δ) = {(σ 1 , σ 2 (σ 1 )) | (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is rational in the game (q, ε, δ)} The following result demonstrates how respecting the semi-lattice R and rationality are related -if ε respects R then ε ⊗ δ will always yield the plays of rational profiles. Theorem 1. Let X be a set, R a semilattice and ε : J P f R X. The following equivalences hold:
1. ε left-respects R ⇔ for any q : X × Y → R and δ : J P f R Y it holds that (ε ⊗ δ)(q) ⊆ Rat(q, ε, δ), and 2. ε right-respects R ⇔ for any q : X × Y → R and δ :
Proof. We first prove the forward direction of the two equivalences.
⇒ (1): Suppose first that ε left-respects R and let (x, y) ∈ (ε ⊗ δ)(q). Then,
and y ∈ δ(q(x, −)). Since ε left-respects R, there exists y
(This doesn't require the axiom of choice since we assume that X is finite.) Then (x, σ 2 ) is a rational strategy profile with strategic play (x, y). ⇒ (2) : Now suppose ε right-respects R and let (σ 1 , σ 2 ) be a rational strategy profile. Then there exists y ∈ Y such that σ 1 ∈ ε(q(−, y)). ε right-respects R, so
It also holds that σ 2 (x ′ ) ∈ δ(q(x ′ , −)) for all x ′ ∈ X. This holds in particular for σ 1 . Hence (σ 1 , σ 2 (σ 1 )) ∈ (ε ⊗ δ)(q).
⇐: For the converse direction of the two results we prove the contrapositive. We will define a 2-player sequential game in which the set of choices for the second player is Y = X → R and the outcome function q : X × (X → R) → R is function application, i.e. q(x, f ) = f (x).
Given an indexing function I : X → P f (X → R), we choose δ : J P f R (X → R) such that δ q(x, −) = I(x). This can be done consistently because q(x, −) = q(x ′ , −) iff either x = x ′ or |R| ≤ 1. In the latter case note that the theorem holds vacuously for R = ∅ and if |R| = 1 then |P f (X → R)| = 1 and so I(x) = I(x ′ ) for all x, x ′ . ⇐ (1) : Suppose ε does not left-respect R. That is, there is I : X → P f (X → R) and x ∈ X such that
but for all p ∈ I(x) it holds that x ∈ ε(p). By construction we have that
Then for any p ∈ δ(q(x, −)) it holds that (x, p) ∈ (ε ⊗ δ)(q), but as there is no p ∈ I(x) such that x ∈ ε(p), there are no rational profiles with play (x, p). Hence (ε ⊗ δ)(q) ⊆ Rat(q, ε, δ). ⇐ (2) : Suppose ε does not right-respect R. So there is I : X → P f (X → R) and x ∈ ε(p) where p ∈ I(x) but
Then a profile (x, σ) where σ(x) = p is rational but (x, p) ∈ (ε ⊗ δ)(q).
If ε left-respects and right-respects a semi-lattice R, we simply say that ε respects R. Corollary 1. Let R be a semilattice and ε : J P f R X. Then ε respects R if and only if for any q : X ×Y → R and δ : J P f R Y it holds that (ε⊗δ)(q) = Rat(q, ε, δ).
This theorem does not directly generalise to games with more than 2 rounds. In section 5 we will give a generalisation.
Somewhat surprisingly, the property of respecting a semilattice is not preserved by the product of selection functions. Only the following lax result holds.
Proposition 2. Let R be a semilattice and suppose that ε :
Proof. Let I : X × Y → P f (X × Y → R) and suppose that p ∈ I(x, y) and that (x, y) ∈ (ε ⊗ δ)(p). Then y ∈ δ(p(x, −)) and
As δ right-respects R, we have that
As ε respects R there exists y 0 ∈ δ(p(x, −)) such that x ∈ ε(λx ′ . p(x ′ , y 0 )). Then, as ε and δ right-respect R,
Then, again as ε respects R, we have that
where
. By this and (⋆) we have that
and the result follows.
We defer providing a detailed counter-example to the non-lax version of the above statement until the very end of the paper when we will have all the necessary machinery in place. In brief, a high-level heuristic for why no such statement regarding left-respecting a semilattice is true goes as follows. Suppose that
where ε and δ respect R. Unfolding definitions and applying this fact, we can infer that there exists some y ′ ∈ Y and some p ∈ I(x, y ′ ) such that x ∈ ε(p(−, y ′ )). We can also infer that there exists some p ′ ∈ I(x, y ′ ) such that y ′ ∈ δ(p ′ (x, −)). We cannot infer that p = p ′ and it is at this point that the proof breaks down.
Relation to Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
A standard solution concept for games with sequential play is the subgame perfect (Nash) equilibrium (SPE). One may conjecture that selection functions can be chosen such that their product computes the set of all plays of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We show that this conjecture is false: It is impossible to compute the set of all SPE plays using the product of selection functions. Subgame perfect Nash equilibria are defined as follows for higher-order sequential games.
Definition 9. Consider a 2-player higher order sequential game with outcome function q : X × Y → R and selection functions ε :
A strategy profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is called a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if the following two conditions hold:
-σ 1 ∈ ε(λx.q(x, σ 2 (x))), and -σ 2 (x) ∈ δ(λy.q(x, y)) for all x ∈ X For comparison, the definition of an ordinary Nash equilibrium is obtained by weakening the second condition to only be required for x = σ 1 . In a Nash equilibrium the second player is only required to play optimally on the equilibrium path, and a Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect if the second player additionally plays optimally if the first player deviates from equilibrium.
The following result demonstrates that selection functions corresponding to the plays of all subgame perfect Nash equilibria do not exist except in uninteresting cases where players are indifferent in all contexts. In particular, this rules out classical games.
Theorem 2. Let ε : J P f R X. Suppose that for all sets Y , payoff functions q : X × Y → R and selection functions δ : J P f R Y it holds that (ε ⊗ δ)(q) is the set of plays of all subgame perfect equilibria of the 2-player sequential game (q, ε, δ). Then ε is constant.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that ε is not constant, so we have contexts k 1 , k 2 : X → R and x ∈ X such that x ∈ ε(k 1 ) and x ∈ ε(k 2 ). Note that the set of subgame perfect equilibria is a subset of the set of rational strategy profiles, and so the set of plays of subgame perfect equilibria is a subset of the set of plays of rational strategy profiles. Hence, ε right-respects R. We will construct a counterexample with δ :
and define δ to be the constant selection function δ(k) = {0, 1}. Then x ∈ ε q(−, 1) and, as ε right-respects R, it follows that
We also have that 0 ∈ δ q(x, −) and, hence, (x, 0) ∈ (ε ⊗ δ)(q). By construction, (x, 0) is not the play of any subgame perfect equilibrium. Hence we reach a contradiction.
Note that whether (ε ⊗ δ)(q) yields the set of SPE plays depends only on ε because δ is acting with perfect information and will always yield an optimal choice from Y .
There do not exist selection functions which uniformly pick out the plays of all subgame perfect Nash equilibria for all outcome functions. This negative result is, at an intuitive level, due to the existence of indifference and, consequently, of possibilistic uncertainty. More precisely, it is due to later players being indifferent regarding choices to which earlier players are not indifferent. In games without such conflicts we do recover subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Suppose that whenever y, y ′ ∈ δ q(x, −) , we have that x ∈ ε q(−, y) if and only if x ∈ ε q(−, y ′ ) . Then (ε ⊗ δ)(q) is the set of plays of all subgame perfect equilibria.
Proof. Let (x, y) ∈ (ε ⊗ δ)(q). ε respects R and hence (x, y) is the play of some rational profile (x, σ). As (x, σ) is rational there is y ∈ Y such that x ∈ ε q(−, y) and y ∈ δ q(x, −) . By hypothesis x ∈ ε q(−, σ(x)) .
Conversely, if a profile σ is subgame perfect it is also rational. As ε respects R we have that (σ 1 , σ 2 (σ 1 )) ∈ (ε ⊗ δ)(q).
We note that the hypothesis in the above proposition can be weakened -the indifferences of ε and δ only need to coincide for plays that could arise from rational plays. Moreover, we observe that the above result can be extended to n-round games but omit the details, which consist of a routine induction on the result.
Relation to strongly and weakly dominated strategies
In this section we extend the previous results to games of arbitrary length. Note that in this paper we will only consider games whose length is precisely n (i.e. all plays have length n), which includes via an encoding games whose length is bounded by n. We do not consider unbounded games, i.e. games whose plays are all finite but which have arbitrarily long plays, which would introduce significant complications.
In particular, if Γ is a set of strategies for some sequential game, then Γ (j) denotes the strategies in Γ which are strategies at round j. Our notion of rationality for n-round games is similar to the two-player case described in previous sections. A strategy at round i is rational if it results in an acceptable outcome for the player at round i given some reasonable hypothesis about how later players will behave (that is, there is some instance in which the later players act rationally that leads to an acceptable outcome).
Definition 10. Let Γ be a set of strategies for a sequential game G. Γ is Gconsistent if for all i < n and σ i ∈ Γ (i) , and all partial plays
Note that if Γ is G-consistent, the G-consistency of Γ ∪ {σ i } depends only on Γ (j) for j > i. With that in mind, we can define the maximal G-consistent set of strategies, denoted by Σ(G), as follows
Definition 11. Let Γ be a set of strategies for a sequential game G. A play x ∈ n i=1 X i is a Γ play if x is the strategic play of a strategy profile σ where σ i ∈ Γ (i) for each i ≤ n.
Theorem 3. As in the two round case, we prove two lax results.
1. Suppose ε i left-respects R for each i < n. Then n i=1 ε i (q) is a subset of the set of Σ(G) plays.
2. Suppose ε i right-respects R for each i < n. Then n i=1 ε i (q) is a superset of the set of Σ(G) plays.
Proof. The proofs proceeds by induction on n, noting that the cases n = 1 are trivial.
(1) : Suppose x ∈ n i=1 ε i (q). As ε 1 left-respects R it is the play of some rational strategy profile (x 1 , f :
is a subset of the set of Σ(G y1 ) plays for all y 1 ∈ X 1 where
, q(y 1 , −) Hence f (y 1 ) is the play of some Σ(G y1 )-consistent strategy profile σ y1 for all y 1 ∈ X 1 . Then the strategy profile τ for G given by
is such that τ i ∈ Σ(G) for all i and the play of τ is x.
(2) : Suppose that x is the play of some σ ∈ Σ(G). A simple check demonstrates that for each y 1 ∈ X 1 we have that σ −1 := (σ 2 , · · · , σ n ) ∈ Σ(G y1 ).
By hypothesis, each
such that x 1 ∈ ε 1 q(−, y −1 ) . As ε 1 right-respects R, we have that
Multivalued selection functions fail to capture subgame perfect Nash equilibria. There are, however, standard solution concepts that they do capturethe iterated removal of strongly dominated strategies and the iterated removal of weakly dominated strategies.
The notion of strict domination is most commonly seen in the context of simultaneous games, in which a strategy σ is said to be strictly dominated by a strategy τ if the former results in a better outcome than the latter whatever other agents decide to play. A solution concept is then obtained by iteratively eliminating strategies that are strictly dominated.
For sequential games one can define an analogous notion as follows. Given finite nonempty subsets S, R of R one can think of R as strictly dominating S if everything in R is strictly greater than everything in S. Given a context p : X → P f (R), this ordering on the reals induces a notion of strict domination on X whereby x strictly dominates x ′ with respect to p if p(x) strictly dominates p(x ′ ).
Example 2. We define two partial orderings on P f (R). The strong dominance ordering is given by S ≺ s T ⇔ max S < min T.
The weak dominance ordering is given by S ≺ w T ⇔ max S < max T and {s ∈ S : s ≥ min T } ⊆ T.
We then define two associated multivalued selection functions.
Similarly,
Proposition 4. ε s i and ε w i respect the semi-lattice given by union on P f (R).
Proof. Easy checks.
We can see that ε s i (p) picks out the 'not strictly dominated' choices x ∈ X given a context p. The previous results tell us that the tensor n i=1 ε s i (q) is the set of Σ(G) plays for the sequential game G = (X i ) n i=1 , (ε i ) n i=1 , q . Namely, it yields the maximal set of the sets Γ with the property that for all σ i ∈ Γ and all partial plays x ∈ i−1 j=1 X i there is σ = (σ i+1 , · · · , σ n ) ∈ n j=i+1 Γ (j) such that σ s i (x) ∈ ε i λy.q ((x, y) σ ) . That is to say, σ i is not strictly dominated for any x ∈ i−1 j=1 X j as there are σ i+1 , · · · , σ n ∈ Σ which are rational for later players and would lead to an acceptable outcome for player ε i . To say that Σ(G)
is maximal with respect to this property is equivalent to saying that it is the result obtained from iteratively removing dominated strategies in the finite case.
The case for weakly dominated strategies is similar, though it differs markedly from simultaneous games in which the order of strategy elimination matters. For purely sequential games, the order of elimination is irrelevant.
We are, finally, in a position to give a counterexample in which ε and δ respect a semilattice R but (ε ⊗ δ) does not.
Example 3. Let B = {0, 1}, and let ε p∈I (x,y) p(x, y) but for all p ∈ I(0, 0) it holds that (0, 0) ∈ (ε ⊗ δ)(p).
